About a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt at Describing and Understanding Some Elements of the European Union Approach to ICANN by Burkert, Herbert
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2003
About a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt at
Describing and Understanding Some Elements of
the European Union Approach to ICANN
Herbert Burkert
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Herbert Burkert, About a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt at Describing and Understanding Some Elements of the European Union
Approach to ICANN, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1185 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol36/iss3/5
ABOUT A DIFFERENT KIND OF WATER: AN
ATTEMPT AT DESCRIBING AND
UNDERSTANDING SOME ELEMENTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO ICANN
Herbert Burkert*
Certain delegations also considered it inappropriate to
quote a private American company in a legislative text of
the European Union and that therefore, should a reference
to ICANN be absolutely necessary, it might be in a recital.'
ABSTRACT
This Article outlines the coming of age of a European Union
Internet governance policy and its activities in setting up a ".EU"
registry.
A recurring leitmotif in these policies is the search for an
adequate regime for a fundamental resource of global
communications, which is still under the influence-if not direct
control-of a single country.
It is suggested that an analogy which has been developed in
Public International Law with regard to shared resources (for
example, water) might be helpful, not only in understanding past
European Union policies, but also in guiding future policies to
transform ICANN into a more traditional, or at least a more familiar
structure.
* President, Research Centre for Information Law at the University of St.
Gallen, Switzerland. Dr. Burkert is also the Legal Policy Adviser for various
organizations. He lives in Cologne, Germany. The author presents his
personal views. He can be contacted at hb@herbert-burkert.net.
1. Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of Working
Party on Telecommunications on 25 January 2001: Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the ".eu" Top Level Domain,
5676/01 Limite (ECO 17, CODEC 74) 3 (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st05/05676enl.pdf.
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However, the ICANN context contains some elements which
might make the outcome of such a Public International Law-oriented
approach less predictable.
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2003, by declaration of the United Nations, is the
International Year of Water.
2
This Article is about a different kind of water. It is about
information flows, and a particularly well-suited organizational and
technical communication infrastructure to secure the continuity of
such flows: the Internet.
At this stage, I shall not carry the analogy any further. 3 To my
knowledge, the water system image has never expressly been used
by any European Union policy actors, nor has this association
provided tacit guidance for these policies. For the moment, however,
the mental association with water systems may be heuristically
helpful to arrive at an understanding of some, but not necessarily all,
of the European Union 4 policies toward the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and ICANN-related issues.
To present these policies, this Article will organize ICANN-
related policy documents of the European Union around two issues
2. More precisely, 2003 is the "International Year of Freshwater." See
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization:
International Year of Freshwater 2003, at http://www.unesco.org/water/iyfw2/
(last modified Feb. 3, 2003).
3. Others have done so already, although in a slightly different context.
See, e.g., halfbakery: Internet Water: Internet Signal Distribution Through
Household Water Supply, at http://www.halfbakery.com/idea/
Internet 20Water (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
4. In correct terminology, "European Union" stands for the three-pillar
structure introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 consisting of the
European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
and the Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). See
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992), available
at http://www.essex.ac.uk/info/Maastricht.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
This Article deals with activities relating to the first pillar, thus, the correct
term would be the European Community. The term "European Union,"
however, has become the most frequently used term and will be used here as
well. It should be noted that because the European Union institutions have
functions with regards to all three pillars, they maintain the reference to the
Union: for example, the Council of the European Union.
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which are linked but which, again, for heuristic purposes at least,
should be kept separate:
o The European Union has participated in the debate on what it
calls the "International Management of the Internet." The
European Union engaged in negotiations multilaterally with
member states, as a separate participant in the Government
Advisory Committee (GAC) to ICANN, and bilaterally, with the
United States government.
o In addition, with this involvement, the European Union has been
essential in establishing a specific .EU domain within, or rather
in relation to, the framework of country code top-level domains
(ccTLDs).
I am aware of at least some shortcomings. Concentrating on
documents does not address the individual policy makers, their
personalities, their games and strategies; in short, everything which
makes ICANN-related newsgroups or similar sites worth reading and
following. I shall not do so. Also, documents only provide a limited
insight into institutional structures and procedures of interaction.
Furthermore, to talk about the European Union approach, or
occasionally by slip of the pen, the European approach, simply by
reference to documents would entail a gross simplification because
the European Union is rich in institutions, structures, and procedures.
To quote from John Peterson and Michael Shackleton's introduction
to The Institutions of the European Union:
The EU remains one of the most elusive of all subjects of
study in the social sciences. It straddles accepted categories
of political organization: less than a federation and more
than a 'regime' . . . , something like a confederation but not
yet a Gemeinschaft... , certainly not a state but not an
'ordinary' international organization either .... 5
One might be tempted to add that the European Union is almost as
difficult to understand as ICANN.
Readers less familiar with this environment should keep in mind
as rough guidance through the maze that the main players, for the
purpose of our subject, in the institutional framework are the
5. John Peterson & Michael Shackleton, The EU's Institutions: An
Overview, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (John Peterson &
Michael Shackleton eds., 2002).
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Council,6 the (European) Commission,7 the European Parliament,8
and the fifteen member states, which although represented in the
6. The Council of the European Union Web site states:
The Council of the European Union is a Community institution
exercising the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties.
Under the Treaty establishing the European Community, the main
responsibilities of the Council are the following:
o the Council is the Community's legislative body; for a wide
range of Community issues, it exercises that legislative power
in co-decision with the European Parliament (see below);
o the Council coordinates the general economic policies of the
Member States;
o the Council concludes, on behalf of the Community,
international agreements between the latter and one or more
States or international organisations;
o the Council and the European Parliament constitute the
budgetary authority that adopts the Community's budget.
Under the Treaty on European Union:
o the Council takes the decisions necessary for defining and
implementing the common foreign and security policy, on the
basis of general guidelines established by the European
Council;
o coordinates the activities of Member States and adopts
measures in the field of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters.
Council of the European Union: General Information: Function, at
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/index.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2003). The Web site of
the Council of the European Union is http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003). The Council of the European Union should not be confounded
with the European Council, which is the assembly of the Heads of State or
Government of the European Union member states and the President of the
European Commission. Neither the Council of the European Union nor the
European Council should be confounded with the Council of Europe (an
international organization). See Council of Europe, at http://www.coe.int (last
modified Feb. 4, 2003). Throughout the text the term "Council" will be used
to refer to the Council of the European Union.
7. Europa: The European Union On-Line Web site states:
The European Commission embodies and upholds the general
interest of the Union. The President and Members of the Commission
are appointed by the Member States after they have been approved by
the European Parliament.
The Commission is the driving force in the Union's institutional
system:
1. It has the right to initiate draft legislation and therefore
presents legislative proposals to Parliament and the Council;
1188
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Council, may still be following their interests outside the Council.9
In the background, the Court of Justice' ° keeps watch. The other
2. As the Union's executive body, it is responsible for
implementing the European legislation (directives, regulations,
decisions), budget and programmes adopted by Parliament and
the Council;
3. It acts as guardian of the Treaties and, together with the Court
of Justice, ensures that Community law is properly applied;
4. It represents the Union on the international stage and
negotiates international agreements, chiefly in the field of trade
and cooperation.
Europa: Institutions of the European Union [hereinafter Institutions], at
http://europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm#3 (last visited Jan. 9, 2003). The homepage of
the European Commission Web site is http://europa.eu.int/comm/indexen.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
8. Europa: The European Union On-Line Web site describes the European
Parliament as:
Elected every five years by direct universal suffrage, the European
Parliament is the expression of the democratic will of the Union's 374
million citizens. Brought together within pan-European political
groups, the major political parties operating in the Member States are
represented.
Parliament has three essential functions:
1. It shares with the Council the power to legislate, i.e. to adopt
European laws (directives, regulations, decisions). Its
involvement in the legislative process helps to guarantee the
democratic legitimacy of the texts adopted;
2. It shares budgetary authority with the Council, and can
therefore influence EU spending. At the end of the procedure,
it adopts the budget in its entirety;
3. It exercises democratic supervision over the Commission. It
approves the nomination of Commissioners and has the right to
censure the Commission. It also exercises political supervision
over all the institutions.
Institutions, supra note 7. The homepage of the European Parliament is
http://www.europarl.eu.int/home/defaulten.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
9. The European Union (represented by the Commission) may sit together
with the representatives of the individual member states in international fora
(and may even sign agreements side by side with them) if the subject matter
falls partly within the European Union's and partly within the member states'
competencies. See Michael Smith, The Commission and External Relations, in
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 264, 269 (Geoffrey Edwards & David Spence
eds., 2d ed. 1997).
10. "The Court of Justice ensures that Community law is uniformly
interpreted and effectively applied. It has jurisdiction in disputes involving
Member States, EU institutions, businesses and individuals. A Court of First
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institutions also watch each other while the member states watch the
institutions so that the limits of competence, as set by the European
Treaties," I are not overstepped.
Toward the end of this Article, I hope to show that there may
indeed be a case for the water systems analogy. Analogy is the
instrument for the law community to restabilize general expectations
in times of change. This analogy might prove useful to the European
Union in transforming ICANN into something more traditional in
terms of Public International Law (or simply, in American
terminology, International Law). However, analogies are difficult
tools in building concepts; analogies carry the potential for
conclusions that might lead to less controllable interactions. The
water systems concept carries such a potential. It may have a lasting
impact on the delicate international management of communication
power by shaping the most efficient shorthand reference to
legitimacy, past power conflicts, their arguments, and their
outcomes. In other words, it may have an impact on the Public
International Law of Global Communications. Some concluding
remarks will remind us of this possibility.
II. EUROPEAN UNION ICANN-RELATED POLICIES PART I: TOWARD A
POLICY OF THE "INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNET"
A. The Response to the Green Paper and its Preparation
Christopher Wilkinson who-in his own words-is still:
Instance has been attached to it since 1989." Institutions, supra note 7. The
homepage of the Court of Justice is http://curia.eu.int/en/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2003).
11. See CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173-306 (1997)
[hereinafter EC TREATY], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/ec cons treatyen.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003);
CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Nov. 10,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 145-72 (1997) [hereinafter EU TREATY], available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/euconstreatyen.pdf (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003) Where available, when citing official European Union
documents, the Official Journal reference will be given. It should be noted,
however, that not necessarily all "Communications," for example, have to be
published in that journal. In all cases, however, a direct reference to an
Internet source is provided in this Article.
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at the forefront of trying to find the necessary balance-in
Europe and globally-between the potentially contradictory
requirements for the liberal self-regulatory regime of
Internet governance, including the necessary flexibility and
speed of response on one hand and the growing pressures
for greater accountability, transparency, and conformity, at
least with the principles of relevant local and international
laws, on the other hand.1
2
Wilkinson points to the March 1998 joint response of the European
Union (more precisely, the Council and the Commission) and the
member states 13 to the U.S. Department of Commerce draft
proposal' 4 of the technical management of the Internet domain
system as one of the first E.U. policy documents in this field. They
prepared this response in due observance of procedure by a
Communication of the Commission to the Council 15 in February
1998. It alerted the member states' governments represented in the
Council of a need for European Union involvement.
The February 1998 Communication already contained the main
issues with which the European Union was concerned:
12. Christopher Wilkinson, Public Policy Issues in Internet Governance,
ON THE INTERNET (Jan./Feb. 2002), at http://www.isoc.org/oti/articles/
1201/wilkinson.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
13. See Reply, Council of the European Union European Commission,
Internet Governance: Reply of the European Community and its Member
States to the US Green Paper (Mar. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Reply to Green
Paper], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
130dftmail/03 20 98.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
14. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (June 10, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/6 5 98dns.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2003). For more
about the Department of Commerce draft proposal and subsequent
developments that led to ICANN, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn In
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50
DUKE L.J. 17, 62-70 (2000).
15. International Policy Issues Related to Internet Governance:
Communication to the Council from the Commission (Feb. 20, 1998)
[hereinafter International Policy Issues], available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/InternetGovernance/MainDoc
uments/Communicationof20_february_1998.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
1191
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1185
1. The international law issue
The Internet governance structure and the norms applicable to
Internet governance issues should leave sufficient space for the
applicability of respective national norms, and where appropriate,
international law. In short, Internet governance issues should be
taken away from the (exclusive) applicability of U.S. law:
International Approach: The principal objection to the
actual proposals of the US Green paper is the lack of
recognition for the need, and practical implementation, of
an internationally coordinated approach as advocated by the
Commission in its recent Communication on Globalisation
and the Information Society.
Jurisdiction: The current US proposals, could in the name
of the globalisation and privatisation of the Internet,
consolidate permanent US Jurisdiction over the Internet as a
whole, including dispute resolution and trademarks used on
the Internet. 1
6
2. The international structure and operation issue:
The technical and organizational operation of Internet
governance, including mediation processes for domain name
disputes, should, in its procedures, supervision, and operational
structure, reflect the international character of the resource. It should
also establish an adequate participative structure. "Participation: It
will be necessary to take steps to ensure that the private sector in
Europe including users and industry fully participates at all relevant
levels in the process."'
17
3. The competitive environment issue:
To the extent that the Internet governance structure or part of
this structure should move into the private sector, a guaranteed
adequate competitive environment should be ensured:
Competition policy aspects: The reorganisation of the
Internet management bodies raises several competition
policy issues:
16. Id.
17. Id.
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[I]t would appear that IANA would for practical purposes
occupy a natural monopoly position with respect to Internet
numbers and the Root servers as well as exercise certain
regulatory functions. The extent to which it would be
indemnified from anti-trust suits is not clear and is probably
not adequately codified from the point of view of European
competition law.
[T]he US proposals for structural separation of
Registry/Database and Registrar activities within NSI,
appear not to go far enough to ensure a level playing field
and fair competition particularly as the alternative CORE
system may not be allowed to create effective competition
for NSI in the short term.
18
The first two issues reflect the European Union's concern with
the concentration of central Internet resources in the United States.
As to the role of participation in the second issue, it was not clear in
the beginning what this would involve. Clearly, it meant there would
be European involvement in the private sector. However, to what
extent "users" would also involve the general public (and public
policy concerns) remained, at that stage, difficult to ascertain.
The third issue, Competitive Environment, while shared with
many observers from outside the European Union, 19 was a classical
European Union concern on the part of the Commission to be more
18. Id.
19. For example, this is reflected in the hearing on "TLD Competition" in
the context of the Workshop ICANN & the Public Interest: Pressing Issues,
organized by The Berkman Center for Internet and Society and The Markle
Foundation in October 1999, which in turn foreshadowed the House
Committee on Energy & Commerce Hearing Is ICANN's New Generation of
Internet Domain Name Selection Process Thwarting Competition? on February
8, 2001. See Is ICANN's New Generation of Internet Domain Name Selection
Process Thwarting Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and the Internet, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. (2001), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/
hearings/02082001Hearing37/hearing.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2003); ICANN
& the Public Interest: Pressing Issues: A One-Day Workshop Presented by The
Berkman Center for Internet and Society and The Markle Foundation (Oct. 31,
1999), at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/workshops/la/ (last visited Jan, 23,
2003).
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precise, since watching over competitive effects on the European
Internal Market falls under its core competence.2 0 Thus, mentioning
this issue in this document reflected a general concern shared by
others, and put a clear mark of political territory on it. While treaties
and subsequent decisions by the European Court of Justice may
establish rules of competence, in day-to-day policy-making, it is the
interpretation of these rules that count. Therefore, it was helpful to
clarify this link. To that extent, the message was not only addressed
to the eventual receiver of the letter based on this Communication,
but also to the member states.
The other issues mentioned in the Communication preceding the
European Union comment on the Green Paper were more general in
nature-namely portability and scalability and the need for
21stability. In accordance with that Communication by which the
Commission had sought authorization,2 2 the European Union
response to the Green Paper duly emphasized the international
perspective:
The European Community and its Member States would
wish to emphasise our concern that the future management
of the Internet should reflect the fact that it is already a
global communications medium and the subject of valid
international interest.
Contrary to such an international approach, the current
US proposals would, in the name of the globalization and
privatization of the Internet, risk consolidating permanent
20. See, e.g., EC TREATY, supra note 11, tit. VI.
21. For more on these objectives, see Richard Delmas, Introduction, in 3
LA GOUVERNANCE D'INTERNET 9, 12 (Frangoise Massit-Follda & Richard
Delmas eds., 2002).
22. The Council is furthermore requested:
to agree to the broad lines of the approach as identified in this
Communication;
to agree to a first, joint reply to the US Government by the
Community and its Member States;
to authorise the Commission to submit to the US Administration the
joint reply of the European Community and its Member States
International Policy Issues, supra note 15.
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US jurisdiction over the Internet as a whole, including
dispute resolution and trademarks used on the Internet.
23
B. From Assessing the White Paper to an Internet Governance
Policy
1. Content of the White Paper
Subsequent talks seemed to satisfy the European Union, judging
from the July 1998 Communication of the Commission on Internet
Governance: Management of Internet Names and Addresses:
Analysis and Assessment from the European Commission of the
United States Department of Commerce White Paper:
On 16 March 1998, the Council and the Commission
addressed a joint reply based on a Proposal from the
Commission. from [sic] the European Union and its
Member States to an inquiry initiated by the US
Department of Commerce in the form of a Green Paper.
The initial policy proposals of the US Green Paper
regarding the organisation and management of Internet
names and addresses received a number of comments and
criticisms from the EU Council and the Commission.
Since then, the Commission has met several times with
the competent US officials. More recently, the US
Government has finally published a White Paper setting out
their policy in this area. As recently announced, US
Government policy is substantially different from that
which was proposed in the initial Green Paper. In many
respects, it now responds to the comments and criticisms of
the European Union, and a large number of other
commentators, both internationally and even from within
the United States.
Consequently, the Commission can now confirm that the
EU should act to participate fully in the process of
organisation and management of the Internet that has been
launched by the US White Paper.
24
23. See Reply to Green Paper, supra note 13.
24. Communication from the European Commission to the European
Parliament and to the Council: Internet Governance: Management of Internet
1195
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The document not only showed satisfaction as to the outcome of
the bilateral and multilateral discussions;25 it also reaffirmed Internet
governance as a legitimate subject for European Union policy-
making and the Commission's mandate, even if shared with the
member states.
2. Taking a look back
The European Union had, of course, discovered the importance
of the Internet well before. This is why, for example, the European
Union bodies were concerned that "illegal and harmful content"
would undermine the appeal and economic potential of this
developing infrastructure and why the Commission previously
addressed content issues in a 1996 Communication. 26 In its 1997
Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media
and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for
Regulation Towards an Information Society Approach,27  the
Names and Addresses: Analysis and Assessment from the European
Commission of the United States Department of Commerce White Paper,
COM(98)476 final [hereinafter Analysis and Assessment], available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/IntemetPoliciesSite/InternetGovernance/MainDoc
uments/com(1998)476.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
25. Werle is somewhat more critical in his assessment:
When, in 1997, the US Department of Commerce issued a Request for
Comments concerning the future role of governmental and non-
governmental organizations in this area after privatisation of the
Internet, the Commission's response unveiled a lack of detailed
knowledge about naming and addressing procedures. Thus, the
Commission only emphasized the need to establish an internationally
recognized transparent system and to ensure adequate European
representation.
Raymund Werle, Internet @ Europe: Overcoming Institutional Fragmentation
and Policy Failure, in 5 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (EIOP) 9
(2001), at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-007.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
This criticism does not sufficiently recognize that the Commission had to look
carefully in all directions before it crossed the street.
26. See Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet: Communication to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, COM(96)487, at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/intemet/communic.html (last modified Nov.
5, 1999).
27. See Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications,
Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for
Regulation Towards an Information Society Approach, COM(97)623,
1196
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Commission asked about regulatory consequences of (among other
issues) the Internet, particularly for the telecommunications sector.
28
Later on, an ambitious "eEurope program" was launched, pointing to
the Internet as a crucial element for the economic, social, and
cultural future of the Union.
29
However, in regards to Internet governance, and particularly in
regards to its own role and the role of the United States, the
underlying sentiment in the European Union before and after the
activities of the International Ad Hoc Committee30 is best reflected in
a 1997 document prepared for the Commission by an Internet
Advisory Group which pointed out-in a somewhat na've manner, to
say the least-under the heading, Internet Governance and
Evolution:
available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/97623.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003).
28. As Werle correctly observes in his paper, the European Union at that
time had been preoccupied in the early 1990s by the transformation of the
telecommunications environment from state monopoly to privatization. See
Werle, supra note 25, at 3-7. This process was complicated by the rising
awareness of the convergence phenomena. Only recently has the
transformation process come to an intermediate pause with the passage of the
"New Regulatory Framework." See New Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications Infrastructure and Associated Services [hereinafter
New Regulatory Framework], available at http://europa.eu.int/
information society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/new rf/index en.htm (last
modified Nov. 13, 2002). This framework (a regulation and several directives)
now provides a new regulatory environment in the European Union not only
for telecommunications, but more broadly for what has been termed as
"electronic communications." See Herbert Burkert, The Post-Deregulatory
Landscape in International Telecommunications Law: A Unique European
Union Approach?, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 739, 739-40 (2002). These new
conditions will have to be transformed into national law by July 2003, with the
exception of the Regulation on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, which, as
the regulation in the set, is directly binding on the member states since coming
into force. See Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop,
2000 O.J. (L 336) 4, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/
en/oj/dat/2000/l_336/I_33620001230en00040008.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).
29. See eEurope: An Information Society For All: Communication on a
Commission Initiative for the Special European Council of Lisbon, 23 and 24
March 2000 [hereinafter eEurope], at http://europa.eu.int/information-society/
eeurope/news library/pdf files/initiative en.pdf (last visited Jan 23, 2003).
30. See Froomkin, supra note 14, at 62 n.163.
1197
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 36:1185
The way in which the Internet is organised and evolves is
sometimes seen as "mysterious", and even by some as
"dangerous for Europe", but, while it might seem surprising
that the process works, there is no mystery. The basic point
is that all companies and organisations with a serious
interest (whether as vendors or as users) in the development
of the Internet need to reach agreement on technical
standards. But, in this fast-moving field, these technical
standards have to be developed very quickly and they also
need to be very robust. Since 1991 this overall process has
been overseen by the Internet Society (ISOC), with
important roles being played by the Internet Architecture
Board (IAB) and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
While the Internet Society was formed in the USA, and
face-to-face meetings of these bodies are largely held, in
English, in North America, they must be seen as entirely
democratic bodies, with well-defined rules of procedure,
which are making a serious attempt to recognise the
international nature of the Internet. Indeed it is a rule of the
IETF that all decisions are taken by e-mail, to avoid the
need for participants to attend all meetings and have good
spoken English. De facto observation shows that the
proceedings and recommendations of these bodies cannot
be dominated either by single vendors or by single
countries, however powerful they may be. We should
further note that some very powerful positions in these
bodies have been and are held by non-Americans. This
includes the chair of the Internet Architecture Board, which
has been held for the past four years by two different
Europeans.
31
Although the European Union seemed content with the results
obtained from the Green and White Paper exchanges as expressed in
the 1998 Communication,32 in 1999, the minutes of a
31. Report, Esprit, The Future of the Intemet-What Role for Europe?:
Interim Report of an Advisory Group (Mar. 11, 1997), available at
http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/i2eurepo.htm.
32. See Analysis and Assessment, supra note 24.
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Telecommunications Council33 meeting still recorded continuing
concern and apprehension:
Commissioner Bangemann expressed his confidence that
the new Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) will come to satisfactory decisions on
the future governance of the Internet.
It is recalled that one year ago the United States published
a White Paper which raised a number of international
policy issues related to Internet governance. A subsequent
clarification of positions between the US and the EU led to
a view largely shared by both sides on the approach to be
taken. The basic arrangements for ICANN reflect the
generally satisfactory outcome of the issues raised by the
US White Paper. Nevertheless, important questions
regarding the structure of ICANN membership and its
functioning still need to be resolved.34
3. Toward the "Internet Governance Communication" 2000
In the meantime, the European Commission tried to arrive at a
more comprehensive approach on the issue of Internet governance
policy, and its concerns became more specific. In a Communication
to the Council and the European Parliament, 35 the Commission once
again ensured endorsement of its policies and actions. However, in
regards to participation, the Commission became more outspoken
and urged the "Member States and the European Parliament to help
in encouraging the flow of information about the ICANN process,
including membership, to all categories of Internet users, particularly
33. The Telecommunications Council unites those ministers (or their
representatives) of the member states in the Council of the European Union
who are responsible for telecommunications-related issues. They meet, as do
their counterparts in other areas, at regular intervals.
34. 2172nd Council Meeting-Telecommunications-Luxembourg, 22
April 1999, 7398/99 (Presse 112) at 15, available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/99/st07/07398en9.pdf (last visited Jan.
23, 2003).
35. Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Organisation
and Management of the Internet: International and European Policy Issues
1998-2000, COM(00)202 [hereinafter Management of the Internet], available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0202en01.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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individuals and public service organizations, to ensure an adequate
level of participation and representation of the interests concerned.
3 6
The reference to "particularly individuals and public service
institutions" is notable. This finally enlarged the initially limited
concern regarding "private sector participation" in the 1997
Communication.37 It also gave it a slightly different focus. The
at-large election was beginning to cast its shadow.
38
By now, the GAC 39 had become an increasingly important
forum for European Union involvement. The Commission
consequently drew particular attention to the role of this gathering
within the ICANN structure. As a prediction of its later
involvement, the Commission noted:
In conclusion, even within their narrowly defined remit, it
is already the case that ICANN and the GAC are taking
decisions of a kind that governments would, in other
contexts, expect to take themselves in the framework of
international organisations.
For the time being, there would appear to be consensus
that the nature of the Internet and the speed of events
preclude this approach and that the current self-regulatory
structure buttressed by active public policy oversight is the
best available solution.40
The main focus of the European Commission's "Internet Governance
Communication" remained on operational issues such as Internet
addressing4' and domain names.42
It is interesting to find in this self-reflection on European Union
involvement with Internet governance an admonition or, perhaps less
dramatically, a gentle reminder to the member states. The
36. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
37. See International Policy Issues, supra note 15.
38. See ICANN: March 2000 ICANN Meeting in Cairo: At Large
Membership and Elections, at http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/atlarge-
topic.htm (last modified Oct. 6, 2002).
39. See ICANN: Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), at
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/ (last modified Nov. 26, 2002).
40. Management of the Internet, supra note 35, at 9.
41. See id.
42. See id. at ll.
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Commission, well aware that transparency43 could not only be
requested from the United States government and from ICANN,
made it a point to remind member states that this principle was also
important for "their" ccTLDs:
It would also be appropriate for the national ccTLD
Registries in the European Union to adapt their policies and
practices to achieve a high level of transparency in their
operations. In so far as the national Registries accept
registrations from entities and individuals from outside their
territory, their dispute resolution policies should take full
account of the interests of third parties in other Member
States, and elsewhere. 44
Finally, the European Union took note that there were still
concerns for ICANN policies regarding the top-level domain (TLD)
.EU,45 intellectual property rights, 46 and the United States position on
them. The Commission also introduced a new concern of data
protection (privacy) with regard to the Whois databases.47 This was
an opportunity for the European Union to link ICANN issues with
the transatlantic exchanges on the adequate level of data protection,
48
and thus enlarge its diplomatic maneuvering space.
43. Transparency of European Union bodies and processes is an always-
present issue in European politics. Significant progress has been achieved.
See Europarl: Citizens' Portal [hereinafter Citizens' Portal], at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/opengov/default en.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
For a critical assessment regarding transparency, see, for example, Statewatch:
FOI in the EU: Freedom of Information in the European Union, at
http://www.statewatch.org/foi.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). For Internet
accessibility of European Union documents, see NYU Law: New York
University School of Law: Library: European Union, European Commission,
at http://www.law.nyu.edu/library/foreignintl/european.html (last modified
Jan. 22, 2003).
44. Management of the Internet, supra note 35, at 16 (emphasis ommitted).
45. See id.; for a more detailed discussion see infra Part III.
46. See Management of the Internet, supra note 35, at 16-17.
47. See id. at 19.
48. For the privacy-related "US-Safe Harbor" negotiations and their
outcome, see Data Protection: Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the
Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, para. 3 [hereinafter Data
Protection], at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/en/dataprot/
adequacy/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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4. From the "Internet Governance Communication" to the present
day
Following proper procedure, the Council, in October 2000,
reacted to the "Internet Governance Communication" of the
Commission with a resolution.49 The Council became more specific
about the issues that it still regarded as mainly unresolved:
o The nature of, and arrangements for, balanced and
equal oversight of some of ICANN's activities by
public authorities,
o the rules to govern generic domains, notably
database ownership and separation of registries' and
registrars' activities,
o the redelegation of certain ccTLDs to another
manager at the request of the Government
concerned,
o regarding the relationships between the registries
established in the Community with their public
authorities on the one hand and with ICANN on the
other hand,
o the transfer of the management of the root server
system from the US Department of Commerce to
ICANN, under appropriate international supervision
by public authorities,
o that those issues need to be addressed with due
regard for both the interests of the international
community as a whole and the public policy
challenges involved, particularly as regards
competition, personal data protection and respect for
intellectual property rights.5 °
The European Parliament, as the next in line to voice its opinion,
passed its resolution in March 2001, 5 1 and added some of its own
49. Council Resolution of 3 October 2000 on the Organisation and
Management of the Internet, 2000 O.J. (C 293) 3, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/c_293/c_29320001014
en00030004.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
50. Id.
51. See European Parliament Resolution on the Commission
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 'The
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concerns. First of all, in the optimistic spirit of the time and
responding favorably to the Commission's remarks on
"participation," it explicitly encouraged the elections for the at-large
directors by stating that it "[e]mphasises the need for all five
geographical areas covered by ICANN to be represented by
democratically elected representatives on the organisation's Board of
Directors."
52
This comment should be kept in mind for the last part of this
Article. The European Parliament, perhaps remembering its own
difficult road to legitimate representation, 53 supplemented the
European Commission's concept of the GAC. It put the concept of
"democratically elected representatives" side-by-side with the
Commission and the Council's concept of a body in which the
member states and the European Union voiced their public policy
concerns by traditional means of "government representatives"--
although somewhat downplaying their status.
54
Still, the Parliament fully endorsed the Commission's role to
bring in the European Union's counterweight to ensure what it saw
as necessary neutrality of ICANN. 55 The Parliament also felt that the
European Union should have an even stronger role within the
ICANN set-up:
[The European Parliament] 3. considers that the
Commission should be a leading authority, backed by the
necessary resources, to negotiate with governments from
Organisation and Management of the Internet-International and European
Policy Issues 1998-2000', EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM(2000)202-C5-0263/2000-
2000/2140(COS)) (No. A5-0063/2001) [hereinafter European Parliament
Resolution], available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/IntemetPoliciesSite/
IntemetGovemance/EPResolutionl 5March200l.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2003). For a .pdf version, see European Parliament Report on the Commission
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 'The
Organisation and Management of the Internet-International and European
Policy Issues 1998-2000' 2001 O.J. (C 343) 286, (COM(2000)202-C5-
0263/2000-2000/2140(COS)), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/
oj/dat/2001/c_343/c_34320011205en02860289.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
52. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 51.
53. The European Parliament started out as a Parliamentary Assembly, and
only in 1962 did it describe itself as the European Parliament, with only
limited advisory power and no direct elections until 1979. See THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT 8-9 (Richard Corbett et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995).
54. Seeid. at9-16.
55. See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 51.
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the US and other parts of the world; insists that neither the
Commission, nor the US Government, nor other
governments should interfere in the organisation and
management of the Internet, but they should give it
sufficient independence and a legal basis at international
level, so that it may be an independent network;
4. Considers that the neutral role of ICANN must be
reinforced by a strong presence from the European Union,
working alongside the US and other governments, through
the Governmental Advisory Committee;
8. Considers it necessary to guarantee the independence
of ICANN from the US Government and to define the legal
framework to which it must adhere in future, on the
understanding that it is of paramount importance to
maintain international neutrality if ICANN is to play a key
role in the global development of the information society;
considers, similarly, that all continents must be represented
on it .... 56
The Parliament then added as a "ceterum censeo," a number of
comments which were, so to speak, for internal European Union use
only.57 The comments contained what may be viewed as reminders
that European Union telecommunications policies could be more
efficient. 5 As a balance, the Parliament also included some
favorable remarks on the .EU proposal, which at that time was
already on its way. 59 Furthermore, the Parliament did not forget
about the competition issue:
60
[The European Parliament] 15. Notes that it took a long
time to introduce the seven new domain names and that the
time thus lost needs to be made up as quickly as possible;
maintains, more generally, the need for a more transparent
and democratic process when other new domain names are
created in the future;
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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16. Attaches priority to the achievement of an open and
competitive environment for registration, supported by an
international regulatory structure for domain name
registration and registrar;
17. Considers it necessary to establish clearly the scope
of the responsibility of the national bodies administering the
registers and of the service contractor, in the event of
dispute; calls therefore on Member Governments to
coordinate their Country Code top level domain registration
policies and procedures, so that users are handled in a
consistent manner and with effective dispute resolution
policies, and further encourages the Commission to
promote effective alternative dispute resolution procedures
to reinforce the domain name registry codes of
conduct .... 61
From then on, attention in the European Union shifted back to
the changes in telecommunications regulations. The European
Union had prepared and was finally successful with a set of measures
for a "New Regulatory Environment." 62 Against this background of
convergence, the European Union kept the Internet in mind. The
New Framework Directive63 -the general part of the other more
specific legislative materials-defined the area of applicability.
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) 'electronic communications network' means
transmission systems and, where applicable, switching
or routing equipment and other resources which permit
the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical
or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite
networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched,
including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks,
electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are
61. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 51.
62. See New Regulatory Framework, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
63. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, 38-39,
available at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/
regulatory/new rf/documents/l_10820020424en00330050.pdf (last visited Jan.
23, 2003).
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used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks
used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable
television networks, irrespective of the type of
information conveyed ....6
The extension of the definition from telecommunications to
electronic communications clarifies the applicability of the
competition and universal service-oriented regulatory principles to
the conditions set by member states on, for example, their ccTLDs
and their administration. Where and whether this will become a new
source of conflict with ICANN will be seen when the process of
transformation into national law has ended.
In a more technological context, the European Union took note
of the slow migration to Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6). 65
However, the place for day-to-day policy making for Internet
governance was now definitely with the GAC.
The Commission kept the Council informed about what was
going on through regular reports on ICANN meetings and on the
activities of the GAC. The Council also took note of the next phases
of ICANN change. In March 2002, in preparation of a
Telecommunications Council meeting, it was noted:
3. Discussions on the reform of ICANN are necessary in
view of the expiry, on 30 September 2002, of the
Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and
the United States' Department of Commerce which
forms the basis of the current arrangements. This
provides a natural opportunity to review the
functioning of these arrangements, and for the
Community to make proposals for reform and/or react
to proposals made by others.
4. The exchange of views planned for the Council is
intended as a first discussion at political level on the
broad approach to be taken on the question of
international Internet governance in the course of
64. Id. art. 2(a).
65. See Council of the European Union: Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Next Generation
Intemet-Priorities for Action in Migrating to the New Internet Protocol IPv6,
COM(02)96 final, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/
en/02/stO6/06637en2.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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forthcoming international discussions, whether these
be multi-lateral (for example in the context of the
existing GAC structure) or bilateral, notably with the
66United States Government.
After having been on the agenda of the March Council
meeting,67 ICANN relations became the subject of a more
comprehensive document which was prepared by the Presidency of
the Council for the next Telecommunications Council meeting in
June 2002. This document was intended to set up guidelines for
coordinating the position of the member states and the European
Union for the GAC position paper on the "Lynn reform." The paper
would be finalized at the GAC meeting in Bucharest from June 24th
to the 26th.68  The document summarized the Lynn proposal on
ICANN reform and provided elements for a response through the
GAC. It reinforced the fact that the channel for input into the reform
process was not restricted to the GAC. It stated that, "[t]he reform of
ICANN involves a negotiation within the ICANN framework in
66. Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to
COREPER/COUNCIL: International Management of the Internet and ICANN
Reform, 7171/02 (ECO 89) (Mar. 19, 2002), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st07/0717 len2.pdf. The duration of
the Memorandum of Understanding has, of course, been extended to
September 20, 2003. See Statement, U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Telecommunications & Information Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce Statement Regarding Extension of Memorandum of Understanding
with ICANN (Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/agreements/docstatement_09192002.htm; see also
Agreement, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications &
Information Administration, Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S.
Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers: Amendment 5 (Sept. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainnane/agreements/Amend5_0919200
2.htm.
67. See Council of the European Union, Provisional Agenda for 2420th
Meeting of the Council of the European Union
(Transport/Telecommunications), 7290/02 (OJ CONS 17, TRANS 90, ECO
92) (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/
02/stO7/07290en2.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
68. See Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to
Coreper: Preparation of the Transport/Telecommunications Council on 17/18
June 2002: International Management of the Internet and ICANN Reform,
9526/02 (ECO 180) (June 3, 2002), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st09/09526en2.pdf.
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parallel with the inter-governmental consideration of these issues in
the GAC and bilaterally with the United States."
69
In general, however, the Presidency's suggestions called for
strengthening the GAC as the channel for public policy concerns and
contained the first officially documented hint for the later European
Union involvement with the secretariat for GAC:
Governments agree that the GAC is the principal forum
for the international discussion of public policy issues
related to the ICANN mission and the Domain Name
System. In this respect, Governments attach great
importance to strengthening the role of GAC and ensuring
its independence from ICANN.
In order to effectively fulfil this role vis-t-vis ICANN,
GAC needs to work more effectively and be better
integrated into the policy formulation process. This will
require the necessary organisation and secretariat and in due
course a more appropriate legal structure. Governments
should provide the necessary resources to this effect. In
anticipation that other administrations will also make
available such resources, the European Commission is also
encouraged to allocate appropriate resources for this
purpose. Responsibility for the GAC secretariat could thus
be shared between several GAC participants. This
secretariat would provide services to GAC both for policy
making and logistics.
70
The guidelines for coordinating the GAC response paper to
ICANN reform were then finalized in the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER-a group that regularly deals with
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
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Council issues under the level of ministers).7' It was then submitted
to the Council meeting in June 2002.72
These guidelines for reaching consensus within the European
Union reiterated some well-known principles of internationalization,
while at the same time emphasizing some self-regulation. "Public
policy" was now fully represented through the GAC (which deserved
adequate strengthening) while the other supplemental means of
participation-democratic elections-once referred to by the
European Parliament,73 was no longer worth mentioning:
The private sector participants concerned are responsible
for reaching mutually acceptable agreements regarding the
structure of ICANN, its membership and financing and its
decision-making processes. Due consideration should be
given to the adequate protection of the public interest by
strengthening the standing of GAC Advice.
Such agreements, however, must give full weight to
internationalisation, transparency and fairness and to
maintaining the principle of geographic diversity and
representation throughout the organisation. These
agreements should be defined in such a way that the
legitimate interests of each area of the world, and of their
respective stakeholders, whether economic, legal or
pertaining to public policies, could be duly taken into
account.
71. This short definition could lead to an underestimation of its function.
"The Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) originated as an
iterative diplomatic forum to prepare meetings of the Council of Ministers. It
quickly and quietly evolved into a locus of continuous negotiation and defacto
decision making, gaining a reputation as 'the place to do the deal."' Jeffrey
Lewis, National Interests: Coreper, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 277 (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds., 2002).
72. See Council of the European Union, Report from COREPER to
Council: International Management of the Internet and ICANN Reform,
9823/02 Limite (ECO 204) (June 13, 2002) [hereinafter Report from
COREPER], available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st09/
09823en2.pdf. The subsequent document 9823/02 COR I corrected the
classification to "LIMITE."
73. See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 51.
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Governments are responsible for public policy, not
ICANN. Where ICANN's activities are likely to involve
public policy implications, ICANN must consult the GAC.
The GAC and ICANN should seek to define in advance
which areas involve such implications. When there is an
ICANN Board majority against a GAC advice, the matter
must be further discussed in good faith between the ICANN
Board and the GAC, with a view to reaching an agreement.
Decisions taken by the ICANN Board against a GAC
advice do not prejudice any steps governments may decide
to take in order to protect the public interest. In all cases,
ICANN should inform GAC on how its advice has been
taken into account.74
Additionally, on the GAC secretariat issue the coordination
guidelines noted:
In order to effectively fulfill this role vis-A-vis ICANN,
GAC needs to work more effectively and be better
integrated into the policy formulation process. This will
require the necessary organisation and secretariat and in due
course, if needed, a more appropriate legal structure.
Governments should provide the necessary resources to this
effect. In anticipation that other administrations will also
make available such resources, the European Commission
is also encouraged to allocate appropriate resources for this
purpose. Responsibility for the GAC secretariat could thus
be shared between several GAC participants. This
secretariat would provide services to GAC both for policy
making and logistics.
75
The draft concluded with a suggestion, or perhaps a warning,
underlining the new GAC self-reliance: "In future reserve powers of
last resort in the event of ICANN failing to fulfil its essential tasks
and for the oversight of the maintenance of the authoritative Root
Zone File could be exercised through the GAC or another
appropriately constituted entity."76
74. Report from COREPER, supra note 72, at 3-4.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id. at 5.
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The minutes of the June Council meeting note the support for
those guidelines for European Union consultation in the GAC
Bucharest position-making process. The Council endorsed the
Permanent Representatives Committee's coordination function for
the Council's involvement in the ICANN process which was already
established in the Council's March 2002 meeting. Furthermore, the
Council did not forget about the "secretariat" point on the agenda:
Delegations' contributions related in particular to the need
to further clarify ICANN's mission, to strengthen the role
and effectiveness of the GAC, among other things by the
establishment of a specific secretariat.
It should be noted that, in its Resolution of 30 October
2000, the Council invited the Member States to consult one
another with a view to establishing common positions to be
adopted within the international fora concerned and, thus,
achieving a genuine globalisation of Internet management,
at its meeting on 25 and 26 March. It instructed the
Permanent Representatives Committee to coordinate
Member States' positions in due time; the guidelines
forwarded to the Council for information were drawn up on
the basis of those instructions.77
The process of internal European Union consultation is now
well installed, and ICANN and Internet governance have become
almost a regular item for the Council, as witnessed by the Committee
of Permanent Representatives' meeting agendas from October 78 and
77. 2438th Council meeting-Transport and Telecommunications-
Luxembourg, 17 and 18 June 2002, 9702/02 (Presse 176) at 31 (June 17-18,
2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?
p_action.getfile=gf&doc=PRES/02/17610[AGED&lg=EN&type=PDF (last
visited Jan. 23, 2003). Note that the cited quote contains an error-the
Resolution was on October 3, 2000, not October 30, 2000. It is known from
the Bucharest meeting that the guidelines of coordination did not make it fully
into the Bucharest document. Also, some of the E.U. member states added
their own addenda to the Bucharest GAC position paper. See Statement,
Governmental Advisory Committee, Governmental Advisory Committee
Statement on ICANN Reform (June 26, 2002), available at
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26jfun02.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2003).
78. See Council of the European Union, Provisional Agenda of 1982nd
Meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee (Part I) on Wednesday
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November 200279 and the last Telecommunications Council Meeting
in December 2002.80
While in the European inter-institutional arena ICANN is on its
way to becoming routine, and the Commission's negotiating power
in GAC is fully recognized at home, the Commission has been able
to move a step forward in consolidating its position in the GAC and
via the GAC toward ICANN. This is made clear from the results of
the Council meeting in December 2002:
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE
INTERNET-REFORM OF ICANN
The Council heard a report from the Commission on
international management of the Internet, and in particular
on the reform of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers), the non-profit-making organisation
which has co-ordinated the Internet domain name system
since 1998.
The Commission's report focused on an ICANN meeting
held in Shanghai from 27 to 31 October, the results of
which it considers to be very positive for the European
Union. The Commission has agreed to provide, on an
interim basis from 1 December, the secretariat for
Government Advisory Committee, the body through which
national governments participate in ICANN, advising it on
matters that concern them, through non-binding
recommendations.
81
23 (14.00) and Monday 28 (15.00) October 2002, at Item 13, 13307/02,
(OJ/CRP1 35) (Oct. 21, 2002).
79. See Council of the European Union, Provisional Agenda of 1986th
Meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee (Part I) on Wednesday
20 (10.15) and Friday 22 (10.15) November 2002, at Item 7, 14375/02,
(OJ/CRP1 39) (Nov. 18, 2002).
80. See Council of the European Union, Provisional Agenda of 4272nd
Meeting of the Council of the European Union (Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy) on Thursday 5 (09.30) and Friday 6
December 2002 (10.30), at Item 11, 15008/02 OJ CONS 70, (TRANS 311,
TELECOM 64, ENER 301) (Dec. 3, 2002).
81. Council of European Union, 2472nd Council Meeting-Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy-Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, at 21,
15121/02 (Presse 380).
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III. EUROPEAN UNION ICANN-RELATED POLICIES PART II: TOWARD
A .EU REGISTRY
A. First Preparations and Motivation
The creation of a .EU TLD was one of the 2001 targets of the
eEurope-Action plan, launched at the Special European Council of
Lisbon on March 23 and 24, 2000: "The Commission will support
the creation of an .EU Top Level domain to encourage cross-border
electronic commerce within the EU and assist those companies
wishing to establish an EU-wide Internet presence."
82
Why exactly the European Union would get involved in the
process of setting up a domain has to be viewed in the "historical
context" of three years ago. The main motivation was industrial
policy. Internet use in the Internal European Union Market had to be
encouraged. In order to encourage the use of the new technology,
confidence-building measures were thought to be a necessity against
the background of diversity in language, culture, and legal systems.
TLDs, the landmarks of the new territory, not only provided
orientation as to brands for goods and services, but they could also
provide guidance on what to generally expect, if there was an
appropriate registry policy. TLDs like ".com", while certainly
attractive for European Union businesses, did not yet provide any
such additional confidence-building information. There might even
be no businesses at all under such a sign. Several European Union
member states, such as France8 3 and, less differentiated, the United
Kingdom,84 had already used "their" ccTLD name85 allocation policy
82. See eEurope, supra note 29, at 9.
83. "L'AFNIC s'efforce de faire des zones de l'espace de nommage
frangais ('.fr'; '.re') un espace de confiance. Son mode d'enregistrement fait
d'elle une des zones les mieux gdres au monde." [AFNIC undertakes
everything to set up a French name space under the .fr and .re [for the Island of
Rdunion] domains as domains of trust. The registration procedures make this
one of the best administered name spaces.] Association Frangaise pour le
Nommage Internet en Cooperation: Presentation de I'AFNIC, at
http://www.nic.fr/presentation/confiance.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). For
the name space policy see Association Frangaise pour le Nommage Internet en
Cooperation: Chartes de Nommage, at http://www.afnic.asso.fr/
enregistrement/nommage.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
84. See Nominet.uk: Choosing a Domain Name, at
http://www.nic.uk/news/guides/regl.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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to introduce additional contextual information and to watch over the
purity of its enforcement.
During the preparatory process, consultation meetings with the
European Internet community had taken place largely through the
European Community Panel of Participants in Internet Organisation
and Management (EC-POP). 6 In addition, the developments in
ICANN had not yet produced any extension of available generic
top-level domains (gTLDs). Last but not least, .EU had symbolic
value: The European Union, in the broadest possible meaning of the
word, was going to have its own "space" on the Internet.
85. See ICANN: March 2000 ICANN Meeting in Cairo: ccTLD Delegation
and Administration Policies, at http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/cctld-
topic.htm (last modified Mar. 7, 2000).
The domain-name system was implemented in the mid-1980s and
now employs approximately 250 'top-level domains' or 'TLDs' (the
string, such as .com, to the right of the last period in the domain
name). These TLDs currently consist of two or more letters. Two-
letter TLDs are referred to as 'country-code top-level domains' or
'ccTLDs,' because those codes correspond to the two-letter
abbreviations for countries (such as .dk for Denmark) or external
territories (such as .gl for Greenland) that are presented on the ISO
3166-1 list. Longer TLDs are known as 'generic top-level domains'
or 'gTLDs'; there are currently seven of these.
ccTLDs have been established to facilitate and promote the spread
of the Internet globally. They are delegated by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) to designated managers, who operate the
TLDs according to local policies that are adapted to best meet the
economic, cultural, and linguistic circumstances of the country or
territory involved. The global policies regarding the operation of
ccTLDs, and concerning the circumstances under which a delegation
will be made or changed, were originally developed by the IANA in
the late 1980s. As the Internet has spread globally and shifted to
commercial use, these policies have evolved at the IANA.
Id.
86. Since February 2000, the European Commission had provided the
organizational backup for the EC-POP, a self-organized group which
commented on ICANN developments and became involved with the
preparations of the .eu registry. See EC Panel of Participants in Internet
Organisation and Management (EC-POP): The Dot EU TLD Registry
Proposal, at http://www.ec-pop.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). For the
comprehensive report on that issue by EC-POP-s Interim Steering Group in
September 2000, see EC Panel of Participants in Internet Organisation and
Management (EC-POP): The Dot EU TLD Registry Proposal [hereinafter
Panel of Participants], at http://www.ec-pop.org/1009prop/ (last visited Jan.
23, 2003).
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B. The ISO Issue
Perhaps initiating .EU was also seen as a telling test case for the
flexibility of then-existing Internet governance structures, the role of
ICANN, and the position of the United States government. .EU did
not belong to those abbreviations that directly qualified as "country"
code TLDs. It was not on the ISO 3166-1 list referenced in the
ICANN ICP-1 policy document87 on country code delegations and
was only on the list of ISO 3166 reserved codes-in fact, for
possible Euro currency use.88 By preparing that policy, IANA
already had tried to avoid the potentially controversial issue of
having to decide which entity should be regarded as a country.
89
The ISO issue was resolved fairly quickly. In May 1999, the
Commission asked the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency to agree to
using the reserved .EU code for an Internet TLD.9 ° ISO agreed9 and
"[d]ecided to extend the scope of the reservation of the code element
.EU to cover any application of ISO 3166-1 that needs a coded
representation of the name European Union," including the use of a
TLD.92 In July 2000, the European Union sent a request for
delegation to ICANN.93 In August 2000, in an interim reply, ICANN
described the general function of the ISO reference and assured
87. See ICANN, ICP-1: Internet Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation (ccTLD Administration and Delegation) (May 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-I.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
88. See European Commission, The Creation of the .EU Internet Top Level
Domain (Commission Working Paper) (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Working
Paper], available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/IntemetPoliciesSite/
DotEU/dotEU-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
89. See Memorandum from Jon Postel, Information Sciences Institute,
Network Working Group to the Internet Community (Mar. 1994), available at
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfcl 591.txt.
90. See Working Paper, supra note 88, at 4.
91. See id. at 4 n.14 (citing Letter from the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency
to the Commission of 7 September 1999).
92. Id. at 4 (quoting Letter from the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency to the
Commission of 7 September 1999). For reference, see also Letter from Erkki
Liikanen, Member of the Commission, to Mike Roberts, CEO and President
ICANN, Regarding .eu Top-Level Domain (July 6, 2000) [hereinafter Liikanen
Letter], available at http://www.icann.org/correspondence/liikanen-letter-
06julOO.htm.
93. See Liikanen Letter, supra note 92.
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speedy treatment of the request.94 Consequently, in September 2000
the ICANN Board, without direct reference to the .EU request,
passed a resolution that was somewhat cryptic for those not familiar
with the fine details of the E.U.-ICANN exchanges:
It is therefore RESOLVED [00.74] that the IANA staff is
advised that alpha-2 codes not on the ISO 3166-1 list are
delegable as ccTLDs only in cases where the ISO 3166
Maintenance Agency, on its exceptional reservation list, has
issued a reservation of the code that covers any application
of ISO 3166-1 that needs a coded representation in the
name of the country, territory, or area involved .... 95
Solving the ISO issue, however, did not answer the questions of who
should run such a registry and what it would offer as added value.
C. The History of the .EU Regulation
In February 2000, a European Commission Working Paper
96
("Working Paper") summarized the situation as follows:
The limited alternatives available in Europe have given rise
to individuals, companies and organisations seeking
registrations in the World Wide Web in the US-Based
existing TLDs, (e.g., .COM), and in other TLDs elsewhere.
In view of the size and economic importance of the
European Union and the extensive use that could be made
of a .EU TLD, both for Electronic Commerce and for the
European Institutions, the European Commission will
request the ICANN Board to delegate the .EU TLD on the
basis of a decision by the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency to
extend the reservation of the existing EU code for the
purposes of the Internet.
97
94. Letter from Michael M. Roberts, CEO and President, ICANN, to Erkki
Liikanen, Member of the Commission, Regarding .eu Top-Level Domain
(Aug. 10, 2000), available at http://www.icann.org/correspondence/roberts-
letter-to-iiikanen- 1OaugOO.htm.
95. Preliminary Report, ICANN, Special Meeting of the Board (Sept. 25,
2000), available at http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-
25sepOO.htm#00.74.
96. Working Paper, supra note 88.
97. Id. at 1, 5.
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Throughout the preparation of the Working Paper and over the
whole process, the European Commission kept in close contact with
the businesses and public sector institutions in the European Union
through, inter alia, the already mentioned EC-POP group.98 The
Working Paper invited comments from interested parties, and some
ninety responses reached the Commission. 99 These responses were
integrated into a Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council °° dated July 2000. During
this same time, the Commission set out to settle the ISO-issue with
ICANN.10 1
The July 2000 Communication summarized the responses to the
Working Paper and organized them around a number of topics:
1. The added value of the proposal for .EU
The Commission stressed the positive Internal Market aspects.
It also pointed to the "confidence element" if connecting registration
to certain qualifying conditions. The Commission, however, added a
cautious note to such inclinations:
It must however be borne in mind that domain name
registration is an automatic, computerised process that, in a
moderately successful Registry, may involve processing
thousands of applications every day. Consequently policies
favouring distinctive features for the future TLD, would
have to be implemented in practice at a reasonable cost.
102
98. See Panel of Participants, supra note 86.
99. See European Commission, The Creation of the .EU Internet Top Level
Domain: Responses, available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/
IntemetPoliciesSite/DotEU/responses.html (last modified May 17, 2000). For
a summary of the responses see European Commission, The Creation of the
.EU Internet Top Level Domain: Analysis of Responses to Commission
Working Paper (COM/2000/153) (February 2, 2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/Analysis of response
s.html.
100. See Commission of the European Communities: Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Internet Domain
Name System: Creating the .EU Top Level Domain, COM(2000)421 fmal
[hereinafter Internet Domain Name System], available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0421 en01 .pdf (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003).
101. See id. at Part 3.2.
102. Id. at 5.
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2. Constitution of the registry organization
Here the Commission remained fairly vague: "The Commission
is facilitating and actively participating in this process in order to
help identify the most appropriate structures and, in consequence, the
framework measures that should be taken by the European
institutions."'
'0 3
3. The role of the European Union
This point was perhaps the most important point in view of the
relationship to the member states and the other European Union
institutions. The role of the European Union was contested in some
of the responses. Here again, the Commission was not too specific,
except confirming that it was intent to stay in the game:
The Commission therefore envisages that it will
participate on behalf of the European Union in the overall
policy formation process for the .EU Domain. It will
facilitate the creation of an adequate structure together with
representatives of appropriate interests drawn from
suppliers and users of Internet services in order to define
broad policy guidelines.
The organisation in charge of the operational registration
of domain names under .EU (the Registry) would be
independent from the policy structure. The Commission
envisages to designate the Registry either in response to a
consensus proposal from the European Internet community,
or if necessary following evaluation of the results of a
public call for expressions of interest. It is envisaged that
the Registry organisation would be a not-for-profit entity.'
0 4
With regards to principal registry policies and jurisdictional
issues, the Commission had not made up its mind yet, particularly as
to whether and how a .EU should be organized into sub-domains.
Jurisdiction, of course, remained a matter of International Private
Law; and only under some restraining conditions would a .EU
registry be able to prove its advantages. If a registry were situated in
103. Id.
104. Id. at 6.
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a European Union country, and the registrants and those being
registered were placed in European Union countries, then the
contesting parties would come under the umbrella of the previously
named Brussels Convention °5 (now Brussels I Regulation' 0 )."'
The Commission was also not yet decided on how exactly any
.EU registry should interact with the national ccTLD registries in the
member states. Furthermore, there was an even more gripping
question: What about the European element in the European Union
domain? Should businesses from European, but non-European
Union member states, be allowed to register under .EU? This
question, the Commission suggested, should be dealt with when the
registry came into existence. 10
The Commission then sketched somewhat generally formulated
proposals on the next steps. At least these proposals provided some
indication that a .EU registry would follow a public policy oriented
approach, providing, one might add, a bit of a contrast to a gTLD
like .com.
(1) In the light of these consultations, the Commission will
draw conclusions for the legal framework for the
operation of the system, including the designation of
the entity in charge of running the .EU Registry and
the guidelines for its registration policy, which will
include measures to counter the speculative and
abusive registration of names. These conclusions will
form the subject of a further Communication to the
European Parliament and the Council.
(2) Ensure that the responsibilities of the EU public
authorities towards the economy at large, the
deployment of the information society in Europe and
the character of public resource of the .EU Domain
105. The Brussels Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2 [hereinafter
The Brussels Convention].
106. Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.
107. See Internet Domain Name System, supra note 100, at 7.
108. See id. at 7-8.
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Name are effectively linked to the policy of the not-
for-profit entity in charge of its operation.
(3) Report to and maintain a dialogue with the Council and
the European Parliament on the results of these actions
and its contacts with the US Government and
ICANN. 10 9
Time was running short if the objective from 2001 was still to be
met. In December 2000, a regulatory proposal-as announced in the
quotation above-was introduced in the next Communication of the
Commission on the issue entitled Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of
the Internet Top Level Domain. EU. "'
This proposal also clarified European Union competence to
those still in doubt. It referred to Article 156 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community"' and thus connected the
action to the objectives of trans-European networks as defined
below:
1. To help achieve the objectives referred to in Articles
[relating to the Internal Market and economic and social
cohesion] and to enable citizens of the Union, economic
operators and regional and local communities to derive full
benefit from the setting-up of an area without internal
frontiers, the Community shall contribute to the
establishment and development of trans-European networks
in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy
infrastructures.
2. Within the framework of a system of open and
competitive markets, action by the Community shall aim at
promoting the interconnection and interoperability of
national networks as well as access to such networks. It
shall take account in particular of the need to link island,
109. Id. at 9.
110. Commission of the European Communities: Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Implementation of the
Internet Top Level Domain ".EU" (COM(2000)827 final - 2000/0328(COD)),
2001 O.J. (C 96/E) 333 [hereinafter Proposal: European Parliament
Regulation].
111. See EC TREATY, supra note 11.
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landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions
of the Community. 
11 2
The instrument chosen in the proposal was a regulation rather
than a directive. 1 3 The proposal still was not very specific on the
registry policies. The Commission was asked to develop such
policies together with the registry and the committee responsible for
the regulatory framework for electronic communications, thus
embedding registry policy into the framework of overall electronic
communication regulation.' 14  The proposal referred to avoiding
illegal name space use and the dispute resolution process-which
should take into account, but not necessarily adopt, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) settlement process.
In June 2001, the proposal went to the Telecommunications
Council meeting. The Council reached an informal "common
orientation" and referred the issue to the Committee of Permanent
Representatives for finalization, who would take into account the
opinion of the European Parliament." 5
The First Reading of the Commission's Proposal in the
European Parliament led to a fair amount of amendments." 6 The
112. Id. art. 154.
113. Regulations create directly binding obligations for those subjected to
that regulation; directives need transformation into national law by the member
states. In this case the addressee was the European Commission.
114. See Proposal European Parliament Regulation, supra note 110, art. 4.
115. For results of that Council Meeting, see Press Release, European
Commission, 2364th Council Meeting-Transport/Telecommunications-
Luxembourg, 27/28 June 2001, 10235/01 (Presse 257), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=PRES/
01/257[01AGED&lg=EN (last visited Jan. 28, 2003). For the text of the
"common orientation" itself, see Council of the European Union, Outcome of
Proceedings of Council on 27 June 2001: Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the ".EU" top level domain,
10425/01 (ECO 200, CODEC 675) (June 29, 2001), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/stl0/10425enl.pdf.
116. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Implementation of the Intemet Top Level Domain ".EU,"
COM(00)827 final at 154 [hereinafter Implementation of the Internet Top
Level Domain .EU]. For amendments, see Implementation of the Internet Top
Level Domain ".EU": Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Regulation on the Implementation of the Internet Top Level Domain ".EU,"
(COM(2000)827-C5-0715/2000-2000/0328(COD)), 2002 O.J. (C 65) E/147
[hereinafter Proposal Amendments].
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proposed amendments referred to, inter alia, data protection; 117 but
most pointedly, the Parliament had a different view on the
institutional setting of the registry. The Parliament did not (and
could not) intervene in the comitology set-up, which placed the
registration policy-making of the Commission into the framework of
the Electronic Communications Committee, as suggested in the
Commission's proposal. Nevertheless, the Parliament suggested that
the registry itself be counseled by a "Policy Advisory Board." This
amendment was resonant with the memories of the at-large elections
and the Parliament's then-expressed view on the necessary
democratic element in Internet governance: 118 "[The Policy Board]
shall include representatives from consumer/user groups, industry,
including small and medium-sized businesses, trade unions and
professional associations, Internet service providers, intellectual
property rightholders and public authorities, including the
democratically elected representatives of the peoples of Europe.""19
The First Reading was just the beginning of a somewhat
complicated (but not uncommon) consolidation process between the
European Union institutions in the co-decision procedure120 as
required for trans-European network measures. In October 2001, the
Commission took note of Parliament's proposed amendments and
introduced an amended proposal for the regulation. 12 1  The
Commission preferred to see the Policy Advisory Board as an option
rather than a necessity. 122 In November 2001, the Council took its
formal "Common Position" on the proposed regulation; it did not
mention a Policy Advisory Board, 123 but at least it conceded a recital:
117. See Proposal Amendments, supra note 116,. amend. 5.
118. See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 51.
119. Proposal Amendments, supra note 116, amend. 18.
120. See EC TREATY, supra note 11, art. 251. For a short thirty-page
description of the co-decision procedure and its variations, see Co-Decision
Guide, available at http://ue.eu.int/codec/en/EN.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
121. See Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Implementation of the Internet Top Level Domain ".EU,"
COM(01)535 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/
2001/en_501PC0535.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
122. Seeid. at5.
123. See Common Position (EC) No 9/2002 Adopted by the Council on 6
November 2001 with a view to adopting Regulation (EC) No.. ./2002 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of... on the implementation of the
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(20) When reference is made to interested parties, provision
should be made for consultation encompassing, in
particular, public authorities, undertakings,
organisations and natural persons. The Registry could
establish an advisory body to organise such
consultation.
124
Still, in November 2001, the Commission issued its opinion on that
Common Position. 12  As to the Policy Advisory Board, the
Commission suggested:
Recital 20 (new): this recital seeks to clarify the meaning
of 'interested parties' in article 5.3, by proposing that
consultation with such parties should include public
authorities, undertakings, organisations and natural persons.
In reflecting on the Parliament's proposal for a Public
Advisory Body to advise on registration of second-level
domains, the Council's proposal refers in this recital to the
possibility for the Registry to set up an advisory body to
organise such consultation. The Commission can agree to
this proposal, with the proviso that any advisory body
should not be an exclusive mechanism for consultation and
that all interested parties, whether members of such a body
or not, are free to participate in any consultation. Such an
advisory body should be established by the Registry
itself.
126
In February 2002, the proposal received its Second Reading 12 7 in the
European Parliament. This Reading resulted in some more
.eu Top Level Domain (2002/C 45 E/03), 2002 O.J. (C 45 E/53), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/ceO45/ce045 20020219en
00530059.pdf.
124. Id.
125. See Commission of the European Communities: Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament Pursuant to the Second
Subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty Concerning the Common
Position of the Council on the Adoption of a Regulation of the European
Parliament and Council on the Implementation of the .eu Top Level Domain/*
SEC/2001/1758 final-COD 2000/0328 */, available at http://europa.eu.int/
smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numd
oc=52001SC 1758 (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
126. Id.
127. See Implementation of the Internet Top Level Domain .EU, supra note
116.
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amendments. Specifically, on the issue of the Policy Advisory
Board, all that was left was the following recital:
(21) When reference is made to interested parties, provision
should be made for consultation encompassing, in
particular, public authorities, undertakings,
organisations and natural persons. The Registry could
establish an advisory body to organise such
consultation.12
8
D. The Regulation
In March 2002, the Commission gave its own comments on
Parliament's proposals from the Second Reading. 129 Subsequently,
in March 2002, the Council approved the results of the Second
Reading. 130 On April 30, 2002, Regulation (EC) No 733/2002 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 April 2002 on the
Implementation of the .eu Top Level Domain, was finally published
in the Official Journal.' 3 ' Recital 20 became Recital 21 but its
wording was unchanged.
128. Position of the European Parliament Adopted at Second Reading on 28
February 2002 with a View to the Adoption of European Parliament and
Council Regulation (EC) No.../... on the Implementation of the .eu Top
Level Domain, 2002 O.J. (C 293 E/63), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/dat/2002/ce293/ce29320021128en00630069.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
129. See Commission of the European Communities: Opinion of the
Commission Pursuant to Article 251(2), Third Subparagraph, Point (c) of the
EC Treaty, on the European Parliament's Amendments to the Council's
Common Position Regarding the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Implementation of the .eu Top Level
Domain Amending the Proposal of the Commission Pursuant to Article 250(2)
of the EC Treaty, COM(02)165 final at 2, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/pdf/2002/en_502PC0165.pdf(last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
130. See European Union, Council of the European Parliament, Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Implementation of the
.eu Top Level Domain, 2000/0328(COD)PE-CONS3613/02 (ECO 75, CODEC
304) (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/
en/02/stO3/03613en2.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003); Press Release, European
Commission, 2420th Council Meeting: Transport and Telecommunications,
Brussels, 25/26 March 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/
rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt-gt&doc=PRES/02/780AGED&lg
=EN (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
131. See European Union, Council of the European Parliament: Council
Regulation 733/2002 on Implementation of the .eu Top Level Domain, 2002
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The Regulation requires a registry, in order to be established, to
deal with the organization, administration, and management of the
.EU TLD. 132 This registry has to be a not-for-profit organization,
operated for the public interest. 133 Specifically, the registry shall:
(a) organise, administer and manage the .eu TLD in the
general interest and on the basis of principles of quality,
efficiency, reliability and accessibility;
(b) register domain names in the .eu TLD through any
accredited .eu Registrar requested by any: (i) undertaking
having its registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the Community, or (ii)
organisation established within the Community without
prejudice to the application of national law, or (iii) natural
person resident within the Community;
(c) impose fees directly related to costs incurred;
(d) implement the extra-judicial settlement of conflicts
policy based on recovery of costs and a procedure to
resolve promptly disputes between domain name holders
regarding rights relating to names including intellectual
property rights as well as disputes in relation to individual
decisions by the Registry. This policy shall.., take into
consideration the recommendations of the World
Intellectual Property Organisation. The policy shall provide
adequate procedural guaranties for the parties concerned,
and shall apply without prejudice to any court proceeding;
(e) adopt procedures for, and carry out, accreditation of .eu
Registrars and ensure effective and fair conditions of
competition among .eu Registrars;
(f) ensure the integrity of the databases of domain
names. 1
34
The Commission, after consultation with the registry and with
the assistance from the Communications Committee (along with
O.J. (L 113) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 733/2002], available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/1l 13/1_11320020430
en00010005.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
132. See id. art. 1, para. 1.
133. See id. art. 3, para. 2.
134. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
1225
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 36:1185
representatives from the member states), which will operate in the
context of the Regulatory Framework, 35 will adopt public policy
rules for the register and the registration process. 136 These policies
shall comprise:
(a) an extra-judicial settlement of conflicts policy;
(b) public policy on speculative and abusive registration of
domain names including the possibility of registrations
of... temporary opportunities for the holders of prior rights
recognised or established by national and/or Community
law and for public bodies to register their names;
(c) policy on possible revocation of domain names,
including the question of bona vacantia;
(d) issues of language and geographical concepts;
(e) treatment of intellectual property and other rights. 1
37
The regulation further makes it clear that the .EU TLD will
operate in conjunction with existing national registries operating
ccTLDs, 38 and that the "first come, first served" method can be
used. 39
E. Further Progress
By now, the member states were consulted on the
implementation procedure. 140 The selection criteria for the registry
were concluded. According to Article 5.2 of the Regulation, the
member states were also consulted about their ability to notify the
Commission and other member states of lists of broadly recognized
135. See The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union:
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, art. 22(1), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, 47,
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/
1_10820020424en00330050.pdf(last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
136. See Council Regulation 733/2002, supra note 131, art. 5, sec. 1.
137. Id. art. 5, sec. 1.
138. See id. at Recital 4.
139. See id. at Recital 20.
140. For the current state of the implementation process, see European
Commission Information Society, A New Internet Top Level Domain: ".eu":
Procedural Steps After Adoption of the Regulation, at
http://europa.eu.int/information society/topics/telecoms/internet/eudomain/pr
ocedure/indexen.htm (last modified Jan. 7, 2003).
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names relating to geographical or geo-political concepts which affect
their political or territorial organization.14 1 Finally, a call for the
expression of interest to operate the registry for the TLD .EU was
published in September 2002;142 the call was closed in October 2002.
By November, the evaluation was concluded with the assistance of
independent external evaluators, the results of which are still subject
to confidentiality. Thus, the final decision on the Registry is
expected in February or March 2003. Consequently, the
Commission has strongly discouraged pre-registration.1
4
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ICANN-RELATED POLICIES: AN
ASSESSMENT AND SOME POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Assessing the Results
This Article shows in some detail the slow and gradual
construction of an "Internet Management Policy" of the European
Union and the process of establishing a .EU registry to be run under
the auspices of the European Commission.
The emphasis of this Article has been on European Union
institutions, influenced by a certain tendency of European private
actors to rely on the more traditional forms of representation in
international fora. The exceptions to this are those large players that
directly intervene on a more international level. This reliance-and
the accepted responsibility by European Union institutions-is a
compensation for the limitations of resources and linguistic
difficulties smaller and medium-sized industries are facing. It is a
compensation still needed in spite of increasing representation of
such interests at the level of European institutions, since these
representations are mainly meant for intra-European Union issues
rather than for external relations.
141. See Council Regulation 733/2002, supra note 131, art. 5, sec. 2.
142. See Commission of the European Communities, Call for Expressions of
Interest for the Selection of the .eu TLD Registry (2002/C 208/08), 2002 O.J.
(C 208) 6, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_208/c_
20820020903en00060022.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
143. See European Commission Information Society, A New Internet Top
Level Domain: ".eu:" News, at http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/
topics/telecoms/intemet/eudomain/index-en.htm (last modified Jan. 9, 2003).
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In response to such expectations, and as a result of both
developing an Internet governance policy and establishing a .EU
regime, the European Commission has firmly established itself as a
separate player, side-by-side with the European member states in the
GAC and to the chaperone of Internet governance, the United States
of America. Whether "separate" in this context also means
"independent" remains difficult to assess from the outside. That is
because any activity of any European Union institution will get
feedback from the member states and other European Union
institutions, all of whom watch each other carefully for any signs of
overstepping the boundaries of competence. However, it can also
safely be assumed, even if only for reasons of practicability, that
internal regulatory requirements and practices still leave sufficient
maneuvering space for day-to-day policy-making. This is true as
long as the player is seen as to observe the basic rules, and if at the
same time, the subject, while being important, is still not seen too
important to remain constantly in the focus of the member states and
the other institutions. 144
By running the Secretariat for the GAC, the Commission has not
only become a rallying point for broader European Union
representation, but also for the GAC in general. With the basic
establishment of the .EU registry, the Commission so far has shown
how to effectively introduce a domain in spite of formal difficulties
(for example, a complex internal decision-making structure, which it
is facing within the European Union institutional framework). It also
hopes to provide a model for a complex regional domain.
In this process, the European Union documents quoted have
reiterated the importance of the Internet domain name system and its
technical and organizational maintenance as a global resource and
have emphasized the global dependency on this resource. The
144. In addition to the European Union as an institution (represented by the
European Commission), all European member states are represented on the list
of accredited GAC representatives with the sole exception of Greece. See
Letter from Dr. Paul Twomey, Chairman, Governmental Advisory Committee
of ICANN, to the Internet Community (July 9, 1999), available at
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/intemational/gac/contact/gac representatives.
htm. The representative of France by an editing error is listed under "Finland."
So the European Union-in its broader meaning-is represented by fifteen
accredited members out of a total of seventy-nine as of December 2002. See
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European Union, over the last four years, has finally come to realize,
understand, and reaffirm by its own policies what Mueller has
summed up as the essence of ICANN: "To understand ICANN one
must first move beyond the hopeful notion that the Internet is
intrinsically voluntary and cannot be institutionalized or
controlled .... ICANN must be understood as a new international
regime formed around a global shared resource."'
145
B. Some Reflections on Consequences
1. On the road to Public International Law rules
Policy statements and practices in international fora that are
guided by such an understanding do have their consequences, and
these consequences tend to be largely self-reinforcing. The
European Union policies have helped to shape the policies and the
position of the GAC in the general setting of ICANN. Reiterated
policy statements and consequential practices, if issued by
international bodies and the representatives of national states, help to
shape future international practices. This in turn contributes to the
body of international "soft law"' 46 as a sort of short-hand reference
to legitimacy, and finally, contributes to form the body of the Public
International Law of Global Communications.
As with national communications law, the international law of
communications is an area of law in search of a structure that would
bring together more traditional areas like media and
telecommunications law with the structures of Internet law.
Additionally, the law of communications, certainly on the
international level, is still in search of appropriate institutions. Some
institutions have taken up some of the new issues for some time,
such as WIPO 147 and its involvement in domain name mediation.
Other institutions seem to have lost their attraction to some of these
145. MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND
THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 217 (2002).
146. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-55 (7th ed. 1997).
147. See WIPO: Arbitration and Mediation Center: Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Service, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/index.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003).
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issues. For example, the International Telecommunications Union
has failed, so far, to be given root administration functions. 1
48
In terms of substance rather than locus, these policy statements
and practices deal with the importance of a unique global resource,
symbolized rather than represented by the "A-Root Server," which is
seen to be under the influence, if not possession, of one country
while being needed by all countries. Only recently this position was
again reiterated in the GAC:
As the GAC has previously noted, the Internet is a global
resource, which supports world-wide economic and social
interaction. The GAC notes that the issues arising from the
co-ordination, at the overall level, of the technical aspects
of the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers are
entrusted to one entity whose activities should appropriately
reflect the global interdependency of the resource. 149
2. Finally about water and communications
In other areas, in similar situations, Public International Law
rules on the responsible sharing of unique resources have been
developed for quite some time.' 50 Such rules have been developed
notably more recently in the Public International Law of the
Environment.' 5 1 One such principle is the principle of "equitable
and reasonable utilization and participation," developed for rules
on the access to and the quality and availability of-and here we are
finally at what we had announced at the beginning of this Article-
water resources. Similar Public International Law principles have
developed in other contexts of water resources.1
53
148. See International Telecommunication Union, at http://www.itu.int/
home/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
149. See ICANN, Communiqud of the Governmental Advisory Committee
30 October 2002, Shanghai, China, available at http://www.icann.org/
committees/gac/communique-30octO2.htm (last modified Nov. 1, 2002).
150. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 230-
34 (5th ed. 1998).
151. See WOLFGANG DURNER, COMMON GOODS: STATUSPRINZIPIEN VON
UMWELTGOTERN IM VOLKERRECHT (2001).
152. G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/51/49 (1997); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 150, at 270.
153. Ian Brownlie names inter alia, international rivers, canals, and straits.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 150, at 267, 272, 276.
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In such situations, the Public International Law of the
Environment asserts that the main holder of the resource is allocated
a trustee function in relation to those dependent on that resource.
Similarly, such a trustee function could be seen to fall on the United
States of America as the holder of the resources that ensure end-to-
end communication and upon which other countries are
dependent.
154
The trustee role is, in itself, a consequence of the Public
International Law principle of national sovereignty. 155 Sovereignty,
as the "personality right" of nation-states, is by its own implicit logic
reflexive: You will have to respect my sovereignty as I am
respecting your sovereignty. Consequently, the principle of
sovereignty implies mutual respect of the sovereignty of others. This
may limit the sovereign use that is being made of one's "own"
resource because of the possible impact of that resource's use on the
sovereignty of others. This in turn requires a system of mutual
consideration-in this case for the operation of a global
communication resource.
Other somewhat older and perhaps more vague Public
International Law concepts might be invoked as well-for example,
the "res communis," which has mainly been used so far in the
context of the High Sea or Outer Space.'
56
154. For an example of first attempts to argue along these lines, see Deborah
L. Spar, The Public Face of Cyberspace, in PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 344 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999); see
also Herbert Burkert, ICANN-ein kommunikationsvolkerrechtliches
Experiment?, MEDIALEX, 2001, at 135.
155. See MALANCZUK, supra note 146, at 10.
156. Brownlie remarks:
The use of these terms is innocent enough providing not too much is
read into them. They represent only a few basic rules and do not
provide a viable regime of themselves. The res communis may not be
subjected to the sovereignty of any state, general acquiescence
apart... and states are bound to refrain from any acts which might
adversely affect the use of the high seas by other states or their
nationals. It is now generally accepted that outer space and celestial
bodies have the same general character.
BROWNLIE, supra note 150, at 174-75 (citations omitted).
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C. European Union ICANN-Related Policies and Public
International Law
While content with the present ICANN regime and its reform
process, European Union policies (and those of the GAC) contribute
to transforming the ICANN structure into a format that might acquire
a Public International Law life of its own. The use of some of the
concepts invoked above might well provide additional legitimacy to
these policies.
At this stage, however, it is time for several reservations:
o Public International Law, perhaps more than any other area of
law, builds on long processes of explicit and occasionally tacit
consensus-building mechanisms.1 57 No such explicit reference
to one of those principles mentioned above has yet been made.
In fact, it seems from the documents quoted, that while always a
possibility, current policies by all relevant actors want to keep
the issue just under the level of Public International Law, even
if, as we have seen at least in one of the documents, 158 reference
has been made to international law implications. However,
upon closer reading, these references related to Private
International Law rather than Public International Law.
o Public International Law is seen to lack proper enforcement
procedures. 159 And in the ICANN case, the main subject of
possible Public International Law consequences would be the
United States of America, and at least some European Union
institutions tend to see this subject as a difficult one when it
comes to International Law questions. 1
60
157. See MALANCZUK, supra note 146, at 7.
158. See International Policy Issues, supra note 15 (explaining implications
of the Internet globally).
159. See MALANCZUK, supra note 146, at 5.
160. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on Echelon, RSP/2002/2596-
T5-0530/2002 of 7 November 2002, available at http://www3.europarl.
eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?PRG=DOCPV&APP=PV2&LANGUE=EN&SD
OCTA=6&TXTLST=1 &POS=1 &TypeDoc=RESOL&TPV=PROV&DATE=
071102&PrgPrev=PRG@TITRE[APP@PV2TYPEF@TITREIYEAR@02IFin
d@/o45%63%68%65%6c%6f%6eFILE@BIBLIO021PLAGE@ I &TYPEF=TI
TRE&NUMB=I&DATEF=021107 (last visited Mar. 29, 2003); see also
European Parliament Resolution of 5 September 2001 on the Existence of a
Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial
Communications (Echelon Interception System) (2001/2098 (INI)), 2002 O.J.
(C 72E) 221, 226, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
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In addition, even if one would follow the reasoning for
trusteeship, and even if the United States national law would seem to
accept such a responsibility, at least in principle, 161 in the context of
Public International Law, it would still be at the discretion of the
U.S. government to decide how to best handle this responsibility for
the global communication infrastructure. Also, there would be a
broad margin of appreciation with regard to the adequate manner of
addressing this responsibility.'
1 62
Additionally, the European Union might want to keep ICANN-
related policies on the political agenda rather than the legal agenda of
transatlantic issues, thus providing a broader range of negotiation
options. Communications issues observed with the Cybercrime
Treaty, 63 the ongoing work at the OECD on the taxation of
electronic commerce," 6 and the continuing business of privacy,
165
not to mention world trade issues and international security
questions, illustrate the need for such an approach. This does not
deny that there is no new material for possible conflict in ICANN
issues themselves, such as the tension between those responsible for
ccTLDs (particularly in the European Union area), ICANN, and
eventually, the U.S. government. There might be some centrifugal
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/ce072/ce07220020321en02210229.pdf (last visited Feb.
3, 2003).
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 (c)-(f) (1986); Declaration of Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
available at http://namespace.pgmedia.net/law/Perritt-Declaration.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
162. See Panel Statement, ICANN Study Circle, Responsibility for
ICANN-Stability and Legitimacy (Feb. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.atlargestudy.org/Zurich-E.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
163. Although an instrument of the Council of Europe, it does affect
European Union Internet policies. See Council of Europe, Convention on
Cybercrime: Budapest, 23.XI.2001, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
164. See Forum on Strategic Management, Tax Administration Aspects of
Electronic Commerce: Responding to the Challenges and Opportunities: A
Report from the Forum on Strategic Management to the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/
M000015000/MO0015520.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
165. See Data Protection, supra note 48.
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forces at work, which might need orientation or re-orientation by
reference to law. 1
66
Last, but not least, the Public International Law arguments put
forward here are still far from being generally accepted; almost all of
these arguments remain contested in the highly dynamic environment
of International Law. Borrowing an image from Gustave Flaubert
(from which I vaguely remember but I am unable to verify), with its
ICANN policies, the European Union has put strings into the sugar
solution of Public International Law, and we may well see crystals
166. See, e.g., Statement, CENTR, Statement on ICANN (July 30, 2002)
(noting issues facing ICANN in carrying out its functions and setting forth the
role and implications of ICANN's structure), available at
http://www.centr.org/news/CENTR-ICANN-statement.html (last visited Jan.
28, 2003); Statement, CENTR, Comments on ICANN Zone Access Policy
(Sept. 26, 2002) (building heavily on arguments already used in the The
Organisation and Management of the Internet International and European
Policy Issues 1998-2000), available at http://www.centr.org/news/ICANN-
Zone-Access-Comments.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). The Zone Access
Policy Statement states explicitly:
Delicate issues such as data protection laws vary from country to
country, and the appropriate legal and responsible way to manage data
must be determined on a local level. For many ccTLDs it is only
appropriate to provide such data and responsibility to a party in their
country (or the EU) which is subject to the same laws as the ccTLD
manager.
It is our considered view that providing zone files to ICANN would
constitute a breach of data protection laws that cover many
jurisdictions within Europe. Although the EC directive 95/46/EC is
implemented differently throughout Europe, the underlying principles
are identical.
The Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament on the legal
protection of databases empowers the creator of any database which
requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial
resources, when said database can be replicated at considerably less
expense.
As registries have a duty as trustees of a database that has been
developed by and for the local community, they have a responsibility
to use this power to protect the database against undesirable use by
third parties.
Id. pt. 2. So arguments once provided by the European Union to steer ICANN
into more traditional waters without challenging its basic role are used here to
push ICANN into a more subsidiary role.
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developing around these strings that could contribute to building a
New Public International Law of Global Communications.
D. Consequences of Consequences
One of these "crystals" deserves a closer look. European Union
involvement in ICANN-related issues has made it obvious that
questions of technical coordination have public policy implications
and that proper procedures for voicing these concerns must be
implemented. In the ICANN context, after many changes-some of
them under the influence of the European Union-these procedures
seem to go the way of traditional international government-oriented
regimes, even if not referred to as a Public International Law
consequence. Transforming the structure of ICANN along the lines
of more traditional forms of government cooperation must be seen as
a contribution to "taming cyberspace,"' 167 or as sort of a belated
fulfillment of what Brian Winston (in a slightly different context)
had once called the "law" of the suppression of radical potential (of
new technologies).1
68
Still, the locus proper of policy-making is not going to be
changed for the moment. The soon-to-be-reformed ICANN structure
still seems to hold enough competitive advantages over other
existing structures of international cooperation on global
infrastructures, so as not to affect the mere existence of ICANN.
ICANN, however, has a specific organizational "stain" from its past,
and this stain may lead to unexpected consequences, particularly for
the European Union. Participating in the ICANN policy-making
process initially exposed the European Union to two specific
challenges, which also touched upon the self-image of the European
Union: transparency and representation.
Transparency, to the extent experienced in the ICANN context,
is a cultural birthright ICANN received from the United States legal
and cultural environment. While it is a point of controversy as to
whether ICANN used this right wisely or used it at all, it contained
sufficient attraction and challenges for at least some of the
participants in the GAC. The European Union, at least, over the last
years, has become increasingly familiar with the challenges of
167. See MUELLER, supra note 145, at 265-67.
168. BRIAN WINSTON, MISUNDERSTANDING MEDIA 23 (1986).
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transparency. 169 Thus, in the long run, and also in view of other
regulatory policies on the European Union level, 170 transparency is
being mastered.
The second challenge of participating in ICANN policy-making
presented to the European Union policy makers has been the
principle of representation. Again, the European Union is touched.
Its political structure, too, suffers from its own representation
problem. The member states' government representatives in the
Council claim to represent the public interest of their countries. The
European Parliament claims the public interests of the European
citizens by whom it is elected, yet the European Parliament is still
limited in its competences in comparison to the Council.' 7' The
"representation and legitimacy" tune that was heard throughout the
debate on at-large-membership elections must have contained
familiar notes for the European Union participants.
Traditional international fora of government cooperation have
approached this problem (rather than solved it) by facilitating access
by non-governmental organizations up to the point of establishing
formal relationships. 172 Non-governmental organizations have their
own problems as to whom they represent and as to the legitimacy of
the procedure of representation. Nevertheless, a liaison with non-
governmental organizations is now a well-established procedure for
international organizations where government representatives had
once claimed sole rights.
173
169. See Citizens' Portal, supra note 43.
170. Transparency of regulatory policies plays an important role. See
Burkert, supra note 28, at 805.
171. See Institutions, supra note 7.
172. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 71, available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/
chapte 1 0.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) ("The Economic and Social Council
may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental
organizations.... ."); see also United Nations Association of the United States
of America, Non-Governmental Organization Affiliation with the U.N. (1999),
available at http://www.unausa.org/programs/coo/ngo.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2003) (providing information on "the history and nature of affiliation between
[Non-Governmental Organizations] and entities within the United Nations
(UN) system").
173. As to the role of non-governmental organizations in this context, see
Herbert Burkert, ICANN-ein Beispiel?, in WER REGIERT DAS INTERNET?
ICANN ALS FALLBEISPIEL FUR GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE 347, 353
(Ingrid Hamm & Marcel Machill eds., 2001).
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At least once, ICANN tried a different approach, and this
experiment has become a stain on ICANN that has not gone away.
There has been comprehensive critique in regards to the question of
whether such a structure of representation has been basically
adequate in the ICANN environment, or whether the procedures had
been adequate and fair.'7 4 Regardless of this criticism, the ICANN
experiment dared to go where no one had gone before. This reminds
me of Ezra Pound's poem: "One hour was sunlit and the most high
gods/ May not make boast of any better thing/ Than to have watched
that hour as it passed."'
175
Regardless of the outcome, a structure was tried which provided
a supplemental approach to representation in international
organizations other than government representation or non-
governmental organizations. It was direct representation.
The forms of at-large membership involvement may well be
more satisfactory to the European Union and may also have their
own legitimate reasons if "stability" is regarded as an essential value
of this infrastructural resource. The European Union only needs to
remember the recent activities of the European Convention 176 to
recall that traditional forms of representation do need legitimization
today rather than the more direct forms. The European Parliament's
resolution 177 on the Communication on Internet governance and its
suggested amendments as to a Policy Advisory Group for the .EU
registry178 were brief reminders of the still-existing attractiveness of
at least the underlying concept.
V. CONCLUSION
ICANN still has to show that it is able to adequately manage the
coordination of governmental and private responsibility for a global
resource that, although not necessarily scarce, depends in its current
174. See, e.g., ICANN At-Large-Membership Study Committee, at
http://atlargestudy.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2003); see also the various studies
listed at ALSC's "Call for Studies," at http://atlargestudy.org/studieslist.shtml
(last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
175. See EZRA POUND, Erat Hora, in SELECTED POEMS 14 (1957).
176. The European Convention, at http://european-convention.eu.int/
bienvenue.asp?lang=EN&Content (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
177. See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 51.
178. See Implementation of the Internet Top Level Domain .EU, supra note
116, at E/63.
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form on a single unifying structure. With its policies, the European
Union is contributing to the stabilization of this structure with
references to notions that have or might have Public International
Law implications. In this process, the European Union was
reminded of the values of transparency and representation. The
European Union has made good progress in mastering the challenge
of transparency, not only in the context of ICANN policy-making,
but also with respect to its own governmental design. The
representation issue, however, may prove to be more difficult. You
may find yourself in a situation where you may call on the helpful
spirits of Public International Law, on legal precedence, and even
occasionally on a daring element of a possible new international
regime, to help you in rooting and developing your own policies, but
you may not be certain what these spirits might do once they have
been called. This too recalls yet another poem, Der Zauberlehrling
(The Magician's Apprentice) by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. This
poem deals with a magic trick on water. 1
79
179. See JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, DER ZAUBERLEHRLING (Kurt-
Bsch-Presse 1990) (Text in German).
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